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1. INTRODUCTION
Let me say at the outset, that I think there is much profit to be had in argumentation
theorists looking at visual aspects of argumentative messages and non-verbal
contributions to argumentative activities. But I also think that resistance to that idea
in some quarters of the field is understandable, because it is not altogether clear
how we ought to be talking about the role of the visual in argumentation. I myself
have written about visual aspects of argumentation, and my paper at this conference
continues that interest (Jacobs, 2000; 2006; 2013). But I haven’t talked about any of
this as ‘visual argument’ or ‘visual argumentation.’ And that is because I share with
skeptics some unease with that way of talking. Tseronis’s (2013) paper goes some
distance in relieving my unease. He shows that it is possible to talk in clear and
insightful ways about what gets communicated by using visual materials and how
that works. He certainly offers some compelling and articulate interpretations.
My unease with talking about ‘visual argument’ is also relieved some by
Tseronis’s insistence on looking at the use of visual materials and their form of
presentation. He points us to just where we ought to be looking. We ought to be
looking at the pragmatics of communication and the functions of communicative
elements. Looking in this way at visual materials avoids the kind of mistakes that led
semiotics into a dead end. We ought not to be looking at visual images as though
there were some parallel to be found to the properties of a linguistic code. There is
nothing like semantics, syntax, morphology, phonology or lexical units in the
domain of visual imagery. What conventionalization and standardization there is
looks much more like the conventionalization of traffic lights or the danger calls of
vervet monkeys.
Looking at the level of pragmatics and talking in terms of use lets us see a
parallel to language use—probably because the same principles of communicative
rationality are at work. An emphasis on pragmatic functions promises a principled
account of how visuals are used to communicate and how visuals can be used to
perform the functions that they do. Now, Tseronis mentions no such principles in
own his analysis (e.g., Gricean or Relevance theoretic principles of implicature:
Grice, 1975; Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 1995), but his analyses
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of particular cases are generally compatible with that kind of exposition. How,
exactly, to apply principles of pragmatics is not exactly obvious, but that’s what
makes for interesting and challenging puzzle solving. The kind of analysis that
Tseronis provides also makes rather obvious the parallel between the functions of
visual form and content and the functions of linguistic figures and tropes of the sort
that have been central to the study of rhetorical style. I have my doubts that these
are properly called communicative functions. At least, it is not clear to me that
figures and tropes are communicative in the sense that the field of pragmatics thinks
of communication—as reflexively intended, openly presented information in the
sense that Grice (1989) talks about non-natural meaning or that Sperber and Wilson
(1995) think about ostensive indications or that Goffman (1959) refers to
information given as opposed to information given-off.
But the problem in calling this communicative is really a problem with
theories of pragmatics and their general failure to come to grips with what Austin
(1975) would have called the perlocutionary effects of language. This is particularly
a problem when the actor strategically designs those effects. But such cases are not
the fully communicative paradigm cases that pragmatics points to when discussing
either speaker meaning or sentence meaning or illocutionary force. Just because a
communicative act evokes meanings does not mean that the act means what it
evokes. In this respect, I think Davidson (1978) is right on target in his theory of
metaphor. So, by pointing to a parallel between the functions of visual materials and
the functions of figures and tropes, Tseronis winds up pointing out, for me at least,
that none of this is all that well understood. Simply because we have long-standing
lists, categories and systems of classification doesn’t mean that we have real
understanding of what is classified or how what is listed works (see Fahnestock,
2011, for a recent insightful analysis). So, the direction that Tseronis takes is one
where we all should look, but we should take a look with our eyes open.
2. PROBLEMS WITH VISUAL ARGUMENT
But I am still uneasy, especially with the ongoing debate that Tseronis reviews over
whether or not there is something that can be properly called “visual argument.” My
unease is more than a niggling concern with the proper usage of terms. And it is
certainly not a rearguard action meant to prevent change in the traditional contents
of the analyst’s toolbox or in the kinds of materials the analyst works with. Please do
not take what I am about to say in that way. Pretty clearly, the visual and the nonverbal in general play an important role in the way that argumentative messages are
conveyed and the way that argumentative activity is conducted. And, also pretty
clearly, the standard package of concepts and models that argumentation theorists
have relied on to analyze and assess arguments is ill suited to the task of addressing
the visual and the non-verbal. Promoters of the study of visual aspects of
argumentation are correct to claim that the visual should not be ignored. And they
are correct to claim that it cannot be reduced to the linguistic without serious
distortion. But, by insisting that attention be given to the visual and that it be
assimilated into the study of argumentation, advocates risk forgetting what makes
an argument an argument and why an academic interest in argumentation exists in
2
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the first place. Even in the examples that Tseronis discusses, there are cases where I
just can’t find anything that can be properly called an argument. In the Guardian ad,
for example, I am not sure what is being claimed or what, exactly, is the argument
for that claim. Does the double-sided picture show that there are two sides to the
issue of women in the military? Does it show that the Guardian sees two sides to the
issue? If that is the claim, how is the picture different from an eye-catching
illustration? If that is the argument, what does it argue for? If the arguments are
verbally explicit, how exactly do the visual materials function with respect to them?
If the arguments are not explicitly present in the written material, does the way that
visual materials operate differ from the way that pragmatics has ordinarily
discussed “context” (admittedly, too often as just a synonym for “magic”)? And if the
written material does not carry the weight of presenting the argument, are we sure
there is an argument at all? Simply because we all are familiar with the arguments
and claims and counterclaims regarding women in the military does not mean that
they have been made by the ad – or even reported by the ad. Because we are
familiar with them, they don’t have to be.
So, why, when we talk about visual argument, do things so easily get all
balled up? What is it that makes the very idea of visual arguments so controversial
and the characterization of any particular visual display as a visual argument so
difficult to pin down? Let me simply mention some sticky issues.
First, the terms ‘argument’ and ‘argumentation’ have ordinary language
meanings, and that ought to be respected. For example, argumentation does not
occur unless arguments are put forward or in some other way made a matter of
active orientation. And if there is an argument in play, that means you can answer
certain kinds of basic questions: What is the argument? What does that argument
prove? These are not technical questions invented by academic specialists. And
those questions can only be answered by articulating linguistic propositions. If you
can’t answer those questions, you don’t have an argument. And if you don’t have an
argument—an argument that is at least in play somehow—then you don’t have
argumentation either. And if you don’t have an argument in the sense of its plain
language meaning, one has to ask, why call it an argument? Why not use another
term that captures what you do mean? When we misdescribe visuals as arguments
we lose track of both what is essential to argument and what is going on in the
visuals. When language goes on holiday, no one profits.
Second, there is no such thing as visual argument—not as a contrast to verbal
argument. There are visual aspects of arguments, visual cues to arguments, visual
framing of arguments, uses of visual material to convey arguments, but the phrase
‘visual arguments’ is a misusage of language. It is a misusage based, I think, on an
equivocation in the contrast between the terms visual and verbal. When we talk
about verbal argument, what we mean is argument in the form of language, and that
includes cases where the language itself is explicit and direct, but also where it is
implicit, indirect, or implicated or otherwise enthymematic. The common, essential
feature is the expression of propositions, i.e., informational content that carries a
truth-value and a logical form. This is why, for example, Pragma-Dialectics defines
the act of making an argument that limits the speech acts to assertives (van
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984; Jackson, 1985). When we refer to visual argument,
3
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we almost always use visual in a different sense, in the sense of the medium of
presentation. But that contrast is based on a category mistake. Verbal messages can
be visual (think of writing, sign language) as well as auditory (spoken language) and
even tactile (think of Braille). If visual is to be a proper contrast to verbal, it must be
so in the sense that the visual imagery lacks some important quality of verbal signs.
What might it lack? Propositional content; truth-value; logical structure; and very
often the conventions or intentions that are the foundations of communicative acts.
Any and all may be absent. In fact, visual images may express no information beyond
themselves. Presentation is not itself communication. Drunk-tank pink may get
prisoners to calm down, but painting a jail cell pink is not making an argument or
claim to the effect that the prisoner should calm down. Often enough the color has
such an effect, but not because the drunk in the tank takes it to communicate, “You
should calm down” (cf. Alter, 2013). Not even should the drunk see that the pink
paint must have been deliberately chosen or even that the painter would expect that
the drunk would see so. None of this gets to the kind of meaning that is needed to
construct an argument or a claim. (This, by the way, is why Davidson thinks the
evocative quality of live metaphors is not part of their meaning—but should be
thought of as ideas and inferences produced as effects in recipients.)
There is a third sticky issue: the normative qualities of argumentation. If
good arguments have any basic function, it is the function of justifying claims. While
everything that justifies a claim need not be an argument, if something is an
argument at all, it is subject to this normative standard. Likewise, contributions to
argumentation as an activity are legitimate if they promote proper assessment of
this function. Articulating these normative properties of argument and
argumentation constitutes the rationale for the academic discipline of
argumentation theory. It is an empirical fact that argument is subject to this kind of
evaluation. But when we turn to visual argument, we seem lost at sea. The problem
is not that visual materials lack legitimacy. The problem is that, when looking at
visual material, we can’t yet see how to apply standards of legitimacy in a
recognizable way. Take the cases presented by Tseronis. How do we even ask about
the legitimacy of the way they function? Maybe principles of pragmatics can be
brought into play here. But if we try to apply traditional conceptions of
communicative clarity—explicitness, precision, singularity of meaning, certainty—
none seems redeemable. Take the “Music is What Matters” ad discussed by Tseronis.
Is the picture about why you should listen to Bob Marley’s music even if you
disapprove of his lifestyle (and presumably, the same for pictures of Keith Richards
and Amy Winehouse)? Or is the assertion “Music is what matters” supposed to be
taken as suggesting that you should listen to the music because it is good music and
not because the music makes an enjoyable accompaniment to getting stoned or not
because it is part of a rebellious lifestyle or not because it is part of what you do
when you are a party person? Is it ambiguous? Is it vague? Does it matter? If a
reader doesn’t get what the WWF ad means by “It’s your turn” is that a problem
with the ad or is it the reader who has failed? I have no idea of how to answer such
questions—but if this were a genuine argument I would know how to proceed.
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Maybe all this should only drive us to keep trying, to think harder, to look
deeper. As I said, these seem to be issues not just for visual imagery, but also for the
pragmatics of communication generally.
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